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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-1339 
_____________ 
 
LINDA J. PERKINS,  
 
                                     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF ELIZABETH;  
SUSAN J. UCCI, individually and in her official capacity;  
OSCAR OCASIO, individually and in his official capacity; 
CORPORATION A THROUGH Z, Fictitious Entities; 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10, Fictitious Persons 
 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. No. 05-cv-3786) 
District Judge:  Hon. Jose L. Linares 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 10, 2011 
 
Before:   JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and GARTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed February 11, 2011) 
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 _______________ 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Linda Perkins appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey granting summary judgment for Appellees Ucci, Ocasio, and the 
City of Elizabeth.   For substantially the reasons set forth by the District Court in its 
December 30, 2009 opinion, we will affirm.
1
   
Perkins, who is African-American, claimed that Appellees, her employer and 
supervisors, (1) violated her equal protection rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) deprived her of her right to make and 
enforce a contract by refusing to pay her as a Program Monitor, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981; (3) intentionally discriminated against her and created a hostile working 
environment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; (4) discriminated against her in violation 
of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) and Civil Service Act 
(NJCSA); (5) negligently or intentionally subjected her to emotional distress; and (6) 
retaliated against her for filing a complaint.  The District Court found that there was no 
adequate evidence to support Perkins’s claims and granted summary judgment to the 
Appellees. 
We emphasize, as did the District Court, that a court is not obliged to scour the 
record to find evidence that will support a party’s claims.  E.g., Doeblers’ Pennsylvania 
Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 820 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006).   When parties fail to 
                                              
1
 Because we write only for the parties, we assume their familiarity with the facts 
of this case and do not recount them here.  We direct those interested in the facts or in the 
District Court’s analysis to the District Court’s thorough opinion, Perkins v. City of 
Elizabeth, 2009 WL 5178385 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009). 
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support their claims with adequate citations to the record, they risk having those claims 
rejected, as was rightly done here.  Perkins’s practical failure to cite record evidence in 
support of her claims, or even to articulate them clearly, is particularly hard to understand 
since the District Court gave her specific instructions and afforded her more than one 
opportunity to do so before it issued its summary judgment opinion.  Courts cannot 
become advocates for a party by doing for that party what the party ought to have done 
for him or herself.  In light of the Appellees’ evidence, and with no showing by Perkins 
of a genuine issue of material fact, the District Court necessarily ruled against Perkins 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).  Likewise, we will affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment. 
